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Abstract 
The chapter investigates the implications of financial liberalization 
and financial deepening on the intertemporal behavior of stock 
returns 1 in the Turkish equity markets. The objective of the study is 
to test return predictability and the changes in this behavior in two 
qualitatively different time periods. The empirical findings indicate 
that return behavior does not change as the financial markets deepen 
in Turkey. Return characteristics qualitatively remain unchanged and 
return predictability continues. The adverse implications of this finding 
are rather severe and they are addressed in the conclusions. 
Introduction 
The recognition of the role of the well functioning financial markets 
in the economic development process has the emphasis shift on 
financial market development and financial liberalization. Massive 
support from supranational organizations such as the World Bank 
(mostly through the IFC) triggered an incredible process in some 
emerging countries which were later labeled as 'emerging capital 
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markets'. The objective of the grand design was both to help these 
countries to increase the domestic savings and to improve the 
allocational efficiency of the capital. Meanwhile a particular emphasis 
has been placed on the development of equity markets to facilitate 
long term as well as efficient fund allocations. Over a twenty year 
period, some developing economies have developed fairly active equity 
markets and managed to capture the attention of global portfolio 
managers. The rapid growth in the funds allocated to emerging 
markets (reaching $45.6 bn at the end of 1993) also led the proliferation 
of research directed towards these markets. Most of the current 
emerging markets research has focused on diversification and efficiency 
implications of these markets, in search of useful tips for portfolio 
managers. However, little attention has been paid to the fund allocation 
implications of the inherent pricing inefficiencies and the potential 
cost of these efficiencies to the local economies. 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the efficiency implica-
tions of the financial liberalization and financial deepening process 
in Turkey as an emerging market, through analysis of intertemporal 
behavior of stock returns. Intertemporal analysis of stock return 
behavior investigates predictability of future returns by using past 
return series over a period of time and questions the existence of 
detectable patterns that can be used to predict the future returns. 
The study focuses on two sub-periods between 1988 and 1995 to 
analyze the nature of predictability. The chapter then provides the 
background on the financial liberalization and the financial deepening 
process. The development of Turkish equity markets is then outlined 
and the potential implications of the return behavior in these markets 
is examined. The empirical findings of the study are presented and 
the chapter concludes with a brief discussion. 
T A B L E 10.1 Capital Flows to Emerging Countries (bn$) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Aggregate Net Flows 101.9 127.1 155.3 207.2 207.4 231.3 
Official Dev. Finance 57.9 65.5 55.0 53.0 48.6 64.2 
Total Private Flows 44.0 61.6 100.3 154.2 158.8 167.1 
Private Debt 15.3 19.0 39.6 40.3 43.8 54.8 
Bank Loans 1.7 2.5 13.8 -4.9 9.2 17.1 
Bonds 3.0 12.8 13.2 38.3 32.2 33.7 
Other 10.6 3.7 12.6 6.9 2.4 4.0 
FDI 25.0 35.0 46.6 68.3 80.1 90.3 
Portfolio Equity 3.7 7.6 14.1 45.6 34.9 22.0 
Source: World Debt Tables, 1996, The World Bank, Washington, D C . 
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The Evolution of the Turkish Financial System 
The Turkish financial markets have undergone a massive restructuring 
and evolution since the 1980 stabilization and reform program. 
Traditionally, the system has been depressed by excessive regulation 
and dominated by the commercial banks with poor product portfolios. 
A n exhaustive list of the elements of the 'financial depression' include 
interest rate ceilings, subsidized credit allocations to designated 
industries, exorbitant taxation, high reserve and liquidity ratios, 
intertwined ownership relationships between financial institutions 
and non-financial corporations, poor asset portfolios of the financial 
institutions, restrictions on the operations of foreign financial institu-
tions and international transactions of the domestic banks, under-
developed capital markets and overreliance on the bank financing, 
and finally government's excessive resort to deficit financing through 
the financial markets. However, none of these distortions were peculiar 
to the Turkish financial markets. They were rather common 
consequences of economic policies implemented in emerging countries 
over a long period of time spanning second half of the 1960s and the 
entire 1970s. These policies put the entire financial system and 
monetary resources at the discretion of the political authorities to 
facilitate the economic development, until they were challenged by 
the economists of the Stanford school. The most notable contribution 
came from M c K i n n o n and Shaw, who developed a version of 
neo-classical financial theory, applicable to the emerging countries. 
They argued that the removal of the 'financial depression' and 
'financial deepening' would accelerate the economic development 
through increasing savings and a more efficient resource allocation. 
The limitations in external financing faced by the emerging countries 
at the end of 1970s, created an imperative to mobilize the internal 
resources. Since then, policy recommendations made by the 
supranational institutions such as the IMF. and World Bank, focused 
heavily on financial liberalization. Turkish governments postponed 
the implementation of these rather new set of policy recommenda-
tions until the end of 1979. However, when the new government was 
inaugurated in November 1979, the necessity for a structural 
adjustment program was found inevitable by both the economic 
bureaucracy and the political authorities. Increasingly uneasy creditors 
of Turkey as well recognized that the short term adjustment programs 
to remedy balance of payments problems were not adequate for longer 
term stability. A l l of these factors and conditions combined, marked 
the initiation of Turkey's transition programs. The backbone of the 
program covering the financial system were embedded in the covenants 
of the Structural Adjustment Loans provided by the World Bank. A 
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three trench series loan included increasing details about the structure 
of the financial markets, and the reforms implemented by the Turkish 
government heavily inspired from these guidelines laying the founda-
tions of the current structure of the Turkish financial system. 
Unt i l the 1980 transition, the intermediation end of the entire 
financial system was carried out by private and state-owned commercial 
and development banks. Although the emphasis on development of 
the capital markets dates back to the 1980 liberalization program, the 
central role of the banking system in the fund allocations has gradually 
shifted towards the capital markets since only early 1990s. The 
introduction of the capital markets law in 1982 and the establishment 
of the Capital Markets Board and Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) were 
milestones of the emergence of the modern Turkish financial markets. 
In the spirit of universal banking, capital markets operations and 
banking services are not strictly separated in the Turkish financial 
system. Most commercial banks are major players in the money and 
the credit markets as well as capital markets. However, brokers licensed 
to operate in the capital markets are not allowed to engage in 
traditional commercial banking activities such as lending and trade 
finance. 
Structurally, the Turkish financial system lacked the private social 
security institutions, such as private pension funds, as major fund 
suppliers to the system. Instead, state owned social security institu-
tions were to supply the wholesale funds to the system. However, these 
funds were appropriated by the government, through compulsory 
placements to the securities issued by the government. These institu-
tions have increasingly been subject to political manipulations, and 
in less than a decade they are marginalized as fund suppliers to the 
financial system. Traditionally, in many developed economies, insurance 
companies have been another significant building block of the financial 
system. However, this segment of the system has never played a 
significant role in the Turkish financial system. This has been partly 
attributed to the excessive regulation of the industry which has recently 
been deregulated to allow product diversification and efficient funds 
management. The absence of the major institutional fund suppliers 
in the system leaves households and corporations as the major fund 
suppliers. The significance of the households or individuals become 
more transparent, as the corporations are fund deficit entities in 
aggregate. 
As in many market economies, the surplus funds are demanded by 
individuals, corporations and the government. The most notable 
characteristic of the Turkish financial markets is the dominance of 
the government as a fund deficit entity. Never ending budget deficits, 
and inadequacy of the tax revenues, leave domestic and external 
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borrowing as the only sensible alternatives to printing money. Given 
the structural restrictions on the external borrowing, frequent resort 
to the domestic money and capital markets becomes inevitable. 
Therefore, crowding-out is phenomenal, and other fund deficit entities 
are left at a significant disadvantage to finance their potentially more 
efficient operations than the government. This mammoth presence 
of the government in the debt markets leaves but few choices to the 
corporations to finance their fund deficits: internally generated funds, 
short term commercial credits and equity financing. However, the 
banks become increasingly reluctant to extend their funds to corpora-
tions since funding the government is a fairly lucrative business with 
low risk. The recent surge in the IPOs and primary equity issues may 
safely be attributed to this phenomenon. 
Deregulation and Financial Deepening 
Interest rate ceilings imposed by the regulatory authorities during 
the 1970s were the basis of the negative real interest rates in the 
economy. This regulation motivated distortion had numerous adverse 
implications on the savings behavior of the households, while allocating 
funds to the corporations at negative real costs in inflationary periods. 
The negative real rates of interest on deposits finally turned to positive 
in 1982. This dramatic switch in the interest rates along with high 
intermediation costs and reserve requirements triggered a jump in 
the credit costs. Immediately after this switch in 1982, bankruptcy of 
a range of inadequately regulated financial institutions strained the 
monetary authorities to loosen the tight control over the system. In 
the following period of 1983-86, the Central Bank smoothly guided 
the markets, and the real rates of interest fluctuated within a narrow 
band of several percentages. In the aftermath of the 1987 elections, 
the government continued to implement its liberalization policies. As 
a first step, the Central Bank controls on interest rates were removed. 
However, this deregulation in the banking system led to a cut-throat 
competition based on the interest rates offered for demand and time 
deposits, which sent the signals of destabilizing risk taking in the 
system. The Central Bank intervened to stop the run, and imposed 
interest rate ceilings. The implications of this episode of the 
liberalization were increasing real interest rates and high interest 
bearing loans to the corporate sector in the 1989-90 period. In the 
following period, banks stayed away from interest rate based 
competition, and tended to index deposit and credit allocation rates 
on the expected inflation. Today, the interest rates in the banking 
system are largely driven by the dynamics in the government debt 
markets. 
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As the deregulation-reregulation cycle continued in the banking 
system, the overall infrastructural evolution of the Turkish financial 
markets were promising. It could safely be claimed that the system 
had been deepening. Although financial deepening per se does not 
imply that the efficiency of the system is increasing, within the spirit 
of financial liberalization, it should be attributed some importance 
and interpreted as an improvement. The indicators of financial 
deepening (see Table 10.2) reveal that Turks' propensity to hold 
financial assets are rapidly increasing after a sharp decline in the 
1978-80 period. The ratio of financial assets to GNP had sharply 
increased from about 22 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 1987. This 
increasing trend persisted to date and reached to 44 percent in 1992 
and 47.4 percent in 1994. This long lasting trend can safely be 
attributed to the increasing share of the public security issues and the 
foreign exchange denominated deposits. 
The trends in the outstanding financial assets clearly demonstrate 
the evolution of the Turkish financial markets. As Table 10.3 
demonstrates, the share of the commercial credits steadily declined 
among the total financial assets. The share of the banking sector in 
the net financial issues has also fallen sharply during the corresponding 
period. 
Both of these indicators reveal the increasing share of the 
T A B L E 10.2 The indicators of Financial Deepening (Percentages) 
M 1 / G N P M 2 / G N P M 2 X / G N P Fin.Assets/GNP 
1980 13.8 17.2 17.2 22.8 
1981 12.7 21.3 21.3 26.7 
1982 13.2 25.0 25.0 31.2 
1893 14.8 24.6 24.6 30.7 
1984 10.8 24.2 25.4 32.2 
1985 9.5 23.7 25.9 33.6 
1986 10.3 23.6 26.8 35.2 
1987 11.4 23.3 28.6 40.0 
1988 8.6 20.8 26.5 37.2 
1989 8.4 20.2 24.9 36.0 
1990 7.9 18.1 22.6 34.2 
1991 7.5 18.8 26.2 39.9 
1992 6.2 15.9 25.3 44.0 
1993 5.8 13.4 25.4 44.2 
1994 5.3 14.5 29.4 47.4 
Source: Public Financing, Financial Structure and Policies; Onder et al, 1994, SPO 
and CBT. 
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T A B L E 10.3 Outstanding Aggregate Financial Assets3 (Percentages) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995* 
Bank Credits 71.2 67.2 62.5 62.2 56.9 50.1 51.3 44.3 40.1 
Public Securities 17.6 19.4 21.7 24.1 22.7 23.9 35.0 46.3 51.4 
Private Sector 7 9.4 11.1 13.4 15.0 19.2 14.1 11 .0 8.4 
Source: 
government in the financial sector. This trend has accelerated in 1994 
and 1995, as the government issues flooded in the market. The 
increasing domination of the public sector in the financial markets 
are also visible in the flow data. As the aggregate fund allocations 
shrunk by 26 percent in real terms in 1994, the share of the government 
in the financial flows went up from 41 percent in 1993 to 58 percent 
in 1994. The corresponding figure reached at 66 percent in the first 
quarter of 1995. The increase in equity issues is the only trend standing 
against the government hegemony in the market. The preceding 
analysis shows that the liberalization of the financial markets accelerated 
the financial deepening. However, implications of these developments 
on the allocational efficiency is yet to be explored. Although the public 
dominance in the financial markets continues to cause crowding out, 
and the increasing resort of the government to the domestic capital 
markets (see Table 10.4) keeps the pressure on the real interest rates, 
remarkable infrastructural and operational progress in some segments 
T A B L E 10.4 Securities by Issuing Sectors (Percent Share) 
Type of Security 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Public Sector 88.1 84.4 89.1 86.6 82.6 91.5 
Government Bonds 46.5 48.9 22.8 37.6 37.0 21.8 
T-Bills 39.5 33.1 63.7 46.2 44.2 68.5 
RSC & FIB 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.8 1.3 1.3 
Private Sector 11.9 15.6 10.9 13.4 17.4 8.5 
Common Stock 5.0 7.1 6.7 2.9 2.0 3.7 
Corporate Bonds 3.1 3.0 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 
Bank Bills 0.5 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 
Commercial Chapters 2.4 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.0 
P & L Sharing Certificates 2.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Participation Certificates 0.8 3.4 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.3 
Asset Based Securities 0 0 0 8.8 13.0 4.1 
Source: Capital Markets Board Monthy Bulletin, various issues in 1994. 
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of the financial markets conjures up possible improvements in the 
allocational efficiency. The following section focuses on Turkish equity 
markets to identify any possible improvements. 
Developments in the Turkish Equity Markets 
Turkish Equity markets exhibited a remarkable progress in less than 
a decade. The 1980 liberalization program attributed a particular 
importance to the equity market development and the development 
plan has been successfully implemented. The establishment of the 
Capital Markets Board in 1982 initiated the infrastructural develop-
ment, and inauguration of the ISE in 1986 started the development 
process. The number of companies traded in the ISE more than 
doubled in eight years, from 80 (40 in the active first tier market and 
40 in the very thin second tier market) in 1986 to 176 in 1994. The 
daily trading volume reached at $197 million in 1995, after averaging 
around $92 mill ion as compared to an average of only $50,000 in 
1986. The market capitalization has also reached at the ranges of 
$30-35 bill ion, from the minuscule $657 mill ion in 1986. The ISE 
has quickly moved on the learning curve and increased its operationally 
efficiency substantially. The trading system has evolved from a tender 
offer system to fully computerized electronic execution in 1994. The 
technological progress of the ISE was also accompanied by a remarkable 
development in the institutional infrastructure. As the impressive 
progress in secondary markets continue, the primary markets have 
also gained momentum. The equity issues in the market surged to 
TL37,000 billion in 1994 from as low as TL101 billion in 1986. The 
upward trend continued in 1995, as the issues increased by 100.2 
percent reaching T L 25,552.2 billion in the first half of the year. The 
progress in the operational efficiency of the secondary markets, 
increasing resort to the equity finance by the corporations, the 
development of the investment banking services and corporate finance 
expertise are all expected to contribute to the sustainable growth of 
this segment of the capital markets. However, equity issues still account 
for a minuscule 3.7 percent of the total securities issued in the financial 
markets. 
Possible Implications on the Return Behavior in the Equity Markets 
Return behavior, both in cross-sectional and in time series analyses, 
provides information on the effectiveness of the asset allocation role 
played by the stock markets. Significant deviations of the return 
behavior from expectations may create an environment which is less 
likely to attract new investors, either domestic or foreign. This may 
Financial Liberalization, Financial Deepening and Efficiency Implications 135 
constrain the market's ability to generate savings and investments for 
the economy. In other words, return behavior may have significant 
implications on the capital flows and sheds light on the risk 
diversification benefits of the stock markets and cost of capital. 
In this study, a subset of market efficiency tests wil l be used. 
Efficiency tests focus on the extent to which available information 
is absorbed in the individual stock prices. As indicated by Fama 
(1991), there are range of efficiency tests: tests for return predict-
ability such as trading rules or autocorrelations (weak form efficiency 
tests), event studies (semi-strong form efficiency tests), or test for 
private information tests (strong form efficiency tests). The focus 
in this chapter is limited to tests for return predictability covering 
two sub-periods between 1988 and 1995. The return behavior has 
been through return predictability tests for each sub-period, and 
intertemporal return behavior was reported (predictability of returns 
over time). Predictability of returns can be evidence of market 
inefficiency i f it is tested within the framework of an asset pricing 
model, and if the model used implies that the expected returns are 
constant through time. However, here a simple form of market 
predictability (autocorrelation) has been used as test of return 
predictability. The theoretical construct behind this simple test can 
be traced back to Fama (1965), and Granger and Morgenstern 
(1970). It is simply a test of the revised version of random walk 
hypothesis. The assumption that the returns are identical ly 
distributed is replaced by identical means following Granger and 
Morgenstern (1970), the condition that returns are independently 
distributed is replaced by uncorrelated returns since this assumption 
is sufficient for practical purposes. The test focuses on identifying 
serial correlation in the return series. 
Although the identification of the significant serial correlations 
may not answer the question concerning the capital market efficiency 
due to the ambiguity of the test (Leroy, 1988), the pattern and signs 
of serial correlations may provide valuable insights into the asset 
pricing process. For instance dominance of positive first order serial 
correlations may result from slow adjustment to new information, 
insider information, averaged data or infrequent trading. O n the 
other hand negative serial correlations may be induced by thin markets 
with wide fluctuations in prices about the intrinsic value, measurement 
errors in adjustment of capital transactions that create reversals in 
return series (Errunza and Losq, 1985). 
There are numerous studies of intertemporal return behavior in 
emerging markets. In a recent study, Cleassens et al. (1995) report 
significant first order serial dependence in a Turkish sample using 
monthly returns of an IFC sample. This study uses a 31 company 
136 C. Bulent Aybar 
sample and daily returns between 1988 and 1995. In order to analyze 
the intertemporal behavior of the daily stock returns two subsequent 
hypotheses are tested. The first general null hypothesis is that the 
daily returns are white noise, i.e. do not exhibit serial dependence 
for sub-periods of 1988-91 and 1991-95. The second null hypothesis 
tests the significance of differences of i-th autocorrelations in two 
sub-periods. 
Empirical Results 
Autocorrelation coefficients of 31 stocks and the ISE index has been 
estimated in two periods covering 1988-91 and 1992-95. In the first 
sub-period, only four return series were identified with no significant 
serial correlation at any lag. Twenty-seven of the 31 series exhibited 
significant serial correlation at various lags. Although serial correlation 
at lag one is consistent for 14 series, hikes in other lags are rather 
sporadic and do not reveal any pattern. The hypothesis that the series 
are white noise has been rejected for 11 of the 31 series and for the 
market index at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels. 
Although more series exhibited significant serial correlations, tests 
bases on Ljung-Box statistic up to six lags, fail to reject the hypothesis 
for 16 series with significant serial correlations. 
The analysis for the 1992-95 period reveals that only three series 
have not exhibited any significant serial correlation at any lag, only 
marginally less than the previous period. First order serial correla-
tions were found to be persistent in this period. While 28 series has 
been identified with serial correlations at various lags, 23 series 
exhibited serial correlation at lag one. Four of these 23 series have 
been identified with serial correlation at lag one only. 
The hypothesis that the return series are white noise has been 
rejected for 19 series and the market index at the 5 percent and 10 
T A B L E 10.5 Average Autocorrelation Coefficients for the Sample 
Lags 1988-1991 1992-1995 
Lag-1 0.1377* 0.1026* 
Lag-2 0.0451 -0.0392 
Lag-6 0.0488 -0.0156 
Lag-12 0.0841 0.00045 
Lag-18 0.01213 0.00177 
Lag-24 0.1689* -0.0080 
*The coefficients are significantly different than zero at 5 and 10% significance levels. 
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percent significance levels. This is considerably higher than 11 series 
rejected in the previous period. The test fails to reject the nul l 
hypotheses for 12 series in this sub-period. 
Average autocorrelation coefficient at lag 1 is smaller in the 
sub-period 1992-95. However, the difference was found to be statisti-
cally insignificant. Although the average autocorrelations in lags 2, 
6, 12 and 24 were found to be significantly lower in sub-period 1992-95, 
none of the average coefficients in these lags were significant except 
for the lag-24 in. The average coefficients in these lags also had sign 
differences as compared to the 1988-91 period. 
Average coefficients for the index are not qualitatively different 
than the whole sample. Although the autocorrelation coefficient at 
lag one is smaller in the second sub-period, the difference is not 
statistically significant. Autocorrelation coefficients in other lags were 
found to be insignificant for both periods. 
Conclusion 
Structural developments in the Turkish financial markets have been 
analyzed and described in some detail during the chapter. As indicated 
earlier, the objective of the study was to explore the implications of these 
developments on the intertemporal behavior of the equity returns and 
interpret the implications of this behavior on the market efficiency. As 
demonstrated earlier, an exclusive test of market efficiency requires an 
underlying asset pricing model. In this study, due to the limitations of 
data, we focused on the predictability of the returns as an indicator, and 
analyzed the intertemporal nature of the return predictability. The 
empirical results suggest that the sample returns exhibit significant serial 
correlations at various lags, which allow predictive model building. 
Empirical results also suggest that nature of the returns do not change 
qualitatively over time during the 1988-95 period. Same findings apply 
for the market index during the sample period. 
T A B L E 10.6 Autocorrelation Coefficients for the ISE Index 
Lags 1988-1991 1992-1995 
Lag-1 0.2644* 0.2230* 
Lag-2 -0.0368 -0.0306 
Lag-6 0.0318 -0.0122 
Lag-12 -0.0140 -0.0096 
Lag-18 -0.0032 0.0067 
Lag-24 -0.0427 -0.0180 
*The coefficients are significantly different than zero at 5 and 10% significance levels. 
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Although return predictability and the non-random character of 
returns are not sufficient to reject the efficiency of the market, it raises 
serious concerns about the functioning of the markets. Although 
return predictability may be caused by a range of factors including 
market inefficiency, it may be perceived as an indication that the 
market is not a level playing field. If this is the case, in the long run 
it may keep uninformed investors from participating in these markets, 
reducing markets' depth and liquidity, and finally it negatively affects 
the role of the stock markets in the economic development process. 
Given the level of predictability observed in the Turkish equity markets, 
these outcomes threaten further development of the equity markets 
and their potential contributions to the economic development. 
Improved disclosure requirements, accounting standards and regula-
tions preventing stock manipulations are the prerequisites for better 
return behavior and should be rapidly imposed on the markets by 
the policy makers 
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Notes 
1. Stock return behavior refers to the characteristics of the movements of returns 
over a period of time. Stock returns may move randomly in an unpredictable 
fashion (as posited in efficient markets hypothesis) as well as in detectable patterns 
defying the unpredictability hypothesis. 
2. This has skewed the capital structure of the Turkish firms towards excessive use 
of leverage, which caused significant problems in 1980s as the real interest rates 
turned out to be positive. 
3. Since the objective of the table is to exhibit trends, asset based securities and 
deposits were excluded in the table. The absence of these variables do not change 
the nature of trends. 
